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Bennett: Adverse Possession: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes of Limitation a

ADVERSE POSSESSION: THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR STATUTES
OF LIMITATION AND DISABILITIES WHICH
TOLL LIMITATIONS
The existence of statutes of limitation affecting real property is
grounded on the public policy favoring the quiet and unassailed possession of land. "[Slociety demands that after a person has acted as
owner and possessor of property for a substantial time, he should be
recognized as such and should not be subject to disturbance by a former
294
owner."
25-YEAR STATUTES

There are three 25-year statutes of limitation in Texas, and they are

intended as "catch-all" legislation. 295 Two of the statutes, articles
5518 and 5519, bar any action by the apparent record owner of property if the requisites of the statute are met by the adverse claimant.29 6
Both these statutes require "peaceable and adverse possession" for 25

294. Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177
(1961).
295. Id. at 178.
296. The proviso to Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANi. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975) (which also
describes those disabilities in the record owner which toll statutes of limitation) provides:
[PIrovided, that notwithstanding a person may be or may have been laboring under
any of the disabilities mentioned in this Article, one having the right of action for
the recovery of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments against another having
peaceable and adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying same, shall
institute his suit therefor within twenty-five years next after his cause of action shall
have accrued and not thereafter.
Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5.519 (Supp. 1975) provides:
No person who has a right of action for the recovery of real estate shall be permitted to maintain an action therefor against any person having peaceable and adverse possession of such real estate for a period of twenty-five years prior to the
filing of such action, under claim of right, in good faith, under a deed or deeds,
or any instrument or instruments, purporting to convey the same, which deed or
deeds, or instrument or instruments purporting to convey the same have been recorded in the deed records of the county in which the real estate or a part thereof
is situated; and one so holding and claiming such real estate under such claim of
title and possession shall be held to have a good and marketable title thereto, and
on proof of the above facts shall be held to have established title by limitation to
such real estate regardless of minority, insanity or other disability in the adverse
claimant, or any person under whom such adverse claimant claims, existing at the
time of the accrual of the cause of action, or at any time thereafter. Such peaceable and adverse possession need not be continued in the same person, but when
held by different persons successively there must be privity of estate between them.
The adverse possession of any part of such real estate shall extend to and be held
to include all of the property described in such deed or instrument conveying or
purporting to convey, under which entry was made upon such land or any part
thereof, and by instrument purporting to convey shall be meant any instrument in
the form of a deed or which contains language showing an intention to convey even
though such instrument, for want of proper execution or for other cause is void on
its face or in fact.
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years. "Peaceable" is defined as continuous and not interrupted by
adverse suit,297 and "adverse possession" as an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of
right inconsistent with and hostile to, the claims of any other. 298

The

third statute, article 5519a, is not a true statute of limitation in the
sense that it does not bar an action by the apparent record owner, but
rather delineates the elements constituting a prima facie case that title

has passed to the adverse claimant.2 9

Although related, the statutes

vary from one another in scope and effect, albeit the end result is the
Same. '
Article 5518
The proviso to article 5518 states that regardless of any disabilities
on the record owner, he must institute suit to recover his land from

an adverse possessor within 25 years after his cause of action has accrued.

00

There are three important differences between the proviso

in article 5518 and requirements in article 5519. First, article 5518
does not require that the adverse possessor act in good faith, as article
5519 does.

Second, no instrument which purports to convey is re-

quired by article 5518.

Finally, the proviso refers to the time when

the "cause of action shall have accrued," while article 5519 refers to

"25 years prior to the filing of such an action." '01
Curiously, no cases have been reported which have utilized the pro297. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5514 (1958).
298. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5515 (1958); see Om, The Court's Charge in
a Land Suit, 13 Sw. L.J. 44, 51 (1959).
299. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5519A (1969) provides:
In all suits involving the title to land not claimed by the State, if it be shown that
those holding the apparent record title thereto have not exercised dominion over
such land or have not paid taxes thereon, one or more years during the period of
twenty-five years next preceding the filing of such suit and during such period the
opposing parties and those whose estate they own are shown to have openly exercised dominion over and asserted claim to same and have paid taxes thereon annually before becoming delinquent for as many as twenty-five years during such period, such facts shall constitute prima facie proof that the title thereto had passed
to such persons so exercising dominion over, claiming and paying taxes thereon.
Sec. 2. This Act shall in no way affect any Statute of Limitation or the right to
prove title by circumstantial evidence under the present Rule of Decision in the
Courts of this State nor to suits between trustees and their beneficiaries nor to suits
now pending.
300. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975). Twenty-five years of adverse possession "is effective as well against those, as against those not, under disabilities." Howth v. Farrar, 94 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 599 (1938).
301. See Note, 14 TEXAs L. REV. 269, 270 (1936). As Professor Larson indicates,
it is difficult to envision a situation where a defendant could successfully plead article
5519, and not have made his case under article 5518. Larson, Texas Limitations: The
Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177, 183 (1961).
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viso to article 5518 apart from article 5519, though undoubtedly
02
the proviso is the more liberal of the two. In Cauble v. Halbert,"
the court of civil appeals held that the defendant need not hold a deed
in order for the statute to apply, but affirmed plaintiff's judgment on
s°
the basis that defendant had not held the land adversely for 25 years. 3
In Pinchback v. Hockless °4 plaintiff failed to establish his limitations
claim because he pleaded only article 5519 and the necessary instrument was not evident. 50° It is entirely possible that a plea of the article 5518 proviso would have induced a finding favorable to the adverse claimant. A court might conclude, however, that the proviso can
be pleaded only against a record owner who was under a disability.
This would hardly be a sensible view, as it would, in effect, make it
easier to gain title from a person under a disability than from one not
so encumbered. The more equitable position would make both articles
5518 and 5519 available to the prospective adverse claimant, who may
then attempt to make his case under the more applicable of the two
statutes. In any case, whenever a situation may arise in which article
5519 is applicable, the proviso to article 5518 should be pleaded as
well, especially where the claimant's instrument may be inadequate
under article 5519.306
Article 5519
"The paramount purpose of [article 5519] is to render indefeasible
the title of a limitation claimant whose claim satisfies the requirements
Article 5519 is the principal 25-year statute
of the statute ... .""'
of limitation, and the elements which must be established by a defend302. 254 S.W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, writ dism'd).
303. Id. at 409.
304. 138 Tex. 306, 158 S.W.2d 997 (1942),

305. Id. at 314, 158 S.W.2d at 1001; accord, Epps v. Finehout, 189 S.W.2d 631, 632
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

306. For example, in Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hunt Petroleum Corp., 439 S.W.2d 853,
859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 455 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.

1970) it was held that a railroad deed which granted a right-of-way was insufficient to

give the railroad's successor a fee simple by adverse possession under article 5519.

The

court went on to say, however, that the railroad's acts were not sufficient to show adversity of possession: therefore, pleading article 5518 would not have aided the defendant. Professor Larson suggests a situation, where an adverse claimant might gain title
under the three, five or 10-year statute, and then plead article 5518 to cut off a disability in the record owner, 25 years after the cause of action accrued. He could not find
a case of this sort. Larson, Texas Limitations: The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15
Sw. L.J. 177, 197 (1961).
307. Free v. Owens, 131 Tex. 281, 284-85, 113 S.W.2d 1221, 1224 (1938).
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ant relying on it are: the land must be adversely possessed,1 8 for 25
years, under a claim of right, and in good faith.30 9 The adverse claimant
must hold under a deed or deeds, or any instrument or instruments purporting to convey the land,310 which deed or instrument is recorded
in the county where the land is located., 11
One of the problems which arose early in the history of the statute
was to determine what types of actions were included in the phrase
"an action for the recovery of real estate. '312 An early case, Deaton
v. Rush,31 held that an action to reform or cancel a deed was not an
action to recover real estate, and until such cancellation, there was no
"'mature right to recover the land.' 314 The supreme court reasoned
that the defendant's deed was only voidable, and until it was cancelled,
the defendant had the right of possession and title."1 5
In the landmark case of Free v. Owen, 1 6 the supreme court reversed
itself, announcing that "an action of any character where the relief
sought, if granted, would have the effect to dispossess the defendant
of land or to invest the complainant with title to land, including the
incidental right of possession" was an action for the recovery of real
estate. 17 Thus, within the framework of article 5519 a suit to cancel
a deed is a right of action to recover real estate.
A collateral aspect of the problem of who has a right of action to
recover real estate is raised where adverse possession is taken against
a life tenant. A problem is presented concerning whether remainder308. Pinchback v. Hockless, 138 Tex. 306, 309, 158 S.W.2d 997, 998 (1942); Johnson v. Dickey, 231 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no writ); Allison
v. California Petroleum Corp., 158 S.W.2d 597, 600-601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
309. Wilhite v. Davis, 298 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ);
Unsell v. Federal Land Bank, 138 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940,
writ dism'd by agr.).
310. West v. Hapgood, 141 Tex. 576, 580, 174 S.W.2d 963, 966 (1943); Pirtle v.
Henry, 486 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Epps v.
Finehout, 189 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
Peterson v. Holland, 189 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945, writ ref'd).
311. See West v. Hapgood, 141 Tex. 576, 580, 174 S.W.2d 963, 966 (1943); Free
v. Owen, 131 Tex. 281, 285, 113 S.W.2d 1221, 1224 (1938); Allison v. California Petroleum Corp., 158 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, writ ref'd
w.o.m.).
312. TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5519 (Supp. 1975).

313. 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W.1025 (1923).
314. Id. at 194, 252 S.W. at 1031.
315. Id. at 192, 252 S.W. at 1030. The deed was procured by fraud. There was
no mention of the 25-year statutes, since the suit was instituted before the statutes were
enacted,
316. 131 Tex. 281, 113 S.W.2d 1221 (1938).
317. Id. at 285, 113 S.W.2d at 1224.
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men have a cause of action within the scope of the liberal interpreta-

tion given article 5519 in the Free case. Texas courts have consistently held that a remainderman has no right of possession of the
land until the death of the life tenant, so that article 5519 does not
run against the remainderman, since he has no cause of action. 3 s The
test in such instances is whether the remainderman has a present pos-

sessory interest in the property: if so, limitations run against him as well

as against the life tenant. 1
Ordinarily, however, the remainderman,
by the very nature of his interest in the land, has no present possessory

right.
Another problem under article 5519 is whether it is effective when
pleaded to bar a suit to cancel a deed on grounds of fraud.

What

meager authority there is indicates article 5519 is effective in such
circumstances. 20 It is clear, however, that an action to set aside a
deed on grounds of fraud or duress, in a case other than one involving
3 21
article 5519, is not generally held to be a right to recover real estate.
It has been repeatedly held that the adverse claimant must hold under a deed or other instrument which purports to convey the property
in order to invoke the aid of article 5519.322 An adverse possessor

318. Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 S.W. 462, 466 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, judgmt
adopted); Bryson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 211 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 148 Tex. 86, 219 S.W.2d 799 (1949); Pool
v. Sneed, 173 S.W.2d 768, 779-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.);
Williams v. Pure Oil Co., 49 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932), atf'd,
124 Tex.341, 78 S.W.2d 929 (1935).
319. Zambrano v. Olivas, 490 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973, writ
refd n.r.e.); Brown v. Wood, 239 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ
ref'd); Evans v. Graves, 166 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, writ ref'd
w.o.m.); Elcan v. Childress, 89 S.W. 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-1905, writ ref'd); see Masterson, Severance of the Mineral Estate by Grant of Land by the Sovereign and Adverse
Possession, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 323, 334-39 (1952); Comment, The Adverseness of Possession to FractionalInterests, 9 BAYLOR L. REv. 168, 189-194 (1957).
In Ferguson
v. Johnston, 320 S.W.2d 906, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
the court distinguished Elcan and the cases it relied upon, on the basis that in that case,
the remainderman had a present possessory interest, as well as a future interest in the
land, and as such could have maintained an action.
320. See Gonzales v. Yturia Land & Livestock Co., 72 F. Supp. 280, 282 (S.D. Tex.
1948); Wilhite v. Davis, 298 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, no writ).
Contra, Cartwright v. Minton, 318 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Article 5518 also bars suit, but only after a cause of action accrues
to the record owner, so it is of no aid to the adverse claimant in a life tenant-remainderman situation. For a discussion of the complexities involved see, Comment, The
Twenty-Five Year Statute of Limitations, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 196 (1958).
321. Socony Mobil Oil Corp. v. Belveal, 430 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Glenney v. Crane, 352 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The interpretation of "right of action to recover real
estate" is unique to article 5519.
322. West v. Hapgood, 141 Tex. 576, 581, 174 S.W.2d 963, 966 (1943); Pirtle v.
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cannot succeed to land which is not described in the instrument.3 23 An
interesting question is raised concerning rights to the minerals in the
land, where there has been a severance of the mineral from the surface
estate. The general rule is that if adverse possession is begun before
the minerals are severed, possession is adverse as to both, but if the
adverse possession is not begun until after severance of the minerals,
no limitations run against the owner of the mineral interest unless ac32 4
tual possession of the minerals is taken by the adverse possessor.
Article 5519 indicates that the instrument under which the adverse
claimant takes possession must only purport to convey the property.
There are cases which seem to imply that minerals which have been
severed may be acquired if they are described in the adverse claimant's
instrument, but there has been no clear ruling to that effect. 325
The statute further requires that the deeds or instruments under
which the adverse possessor claims must be recorded. 26 Possession
need not be maintained in one person; tacking of adverse possession
is permissible. There must be privity of estate, however, among those
subsequently in possession.327 Two questions are raised by this language: first, what meaning does "privity of estate" have in relation to
article 5519, and secondly, must every deed or instrument in the adverse claimant's "chain of title" be recorded?
Free v. Owen 3 28 answers both of these questions. There the court held that "privity of
estate" within the context of article 5519 means only privity of possession.3 29 In answering the second question, it was stated that the recorHenry, 486 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ); Epps v. Finehout,
189 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Peterson
v. Holland, 189 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945, writ ref'd).
323. Pinchback v. Hockless, 138 Tex. 306, 310, 158 S.W.2d 997, 1000 (1942); Davenport v. Bass, 137 Tex. 248, 252, 153 S.W.2d 471, 473 (1941); Rio Bravo Oil Co. v.

Hunt Petroleum Corp., 439 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 455 S.W.2d 722 (1970).

324. Henley v. United States, 396 F.2d 956, 966-67 (Ct. Cl. 1968); King v. Hester,
200 F.2d 807, 815 (5th Cir. 1952); West v. Hapgood, 141 Tex. 576, 580, 174 S.W.2d

963, 966 (1943); Saunders v. Hornsby, 173 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.). But see McLendon v. Comer, 200 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Texarkana 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

325. Cf. McClendon v. Comer, 200 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Masterson, Severance of the Mineral Estate by Grant of

Land by the Sovereign and Adverse Possession, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 323, 334-39 (1952).
326. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5519 (Supp. 1975); see West v. Hapgood, 141
Tex. 576, 581, 174 S.W.2d 963, 966 (1943); Free v. Owen, 131 Tex. 281, 285, 113

S.W.2d 1221, 1224 (1938); Allison v. California Petroleum Corp., 158 S.W.2d 597, 600
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
327. TEX. REV. Cav. STAT. ANN. art. 5519 (Supp. 1975).
328. 131 Tex. 281, 113 S.W.2d 1221 (1938).

329. Id. at 286, 113 S.W.2d at 1224.
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dation of the first deed by the original adverse possessor inures to the
benefit of his successors, as long as the original claimant and his successors stand in privity of possession. 380 Thus, the original adverse
claimant's successors need not record their instruments in order to gain
the benefit of article 5519.
The good faith requirement in article 5519 raises an issue as to its
meaning within the context of the statute. There has been little more
than a recitation of the requirement by the courts thus far. 33 ' It is improbable that the "good faith" requirement has much significance in
an adverse possession situation, since an adverse claimant is necessarily
hostile to all others in his claim of right to the land.
Finally, article 5519 provides that the successful adverse claimant
has "a good and marketable title" to the land.33 2 In spite of this language in the statute, it is clear that the grantor of land does not convey
a good and marketable title to his grantee if the land was acquired under article 5519.333
Although article 5519 is basically unambiguous, some changes would
remove any future doubts as to its catchall nature. A phrase should
be added to the effect that fraud or duress, worked against a grantor,
should be given no consideration, and the good faith requirement
should be deleted as meaningless surplusage in a catchall adverse possession statute such as article 5519. Secondly, the broad interpretation
given by the Free case should be written into the statute. By bringing
within the purview of the statute any sort of action which ultimately
may result in the recovery of the land by the record owner or a grantor,
article 5519 would assume the complete catchall status which was intended.
330. Id. at 285-286, 113 S.W.2d at 1224.
331. In Unsell v. Federal Land Bank, 138 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, writ dism'd by agr.) the court states that where the wife took deed from
her deceased husband's papers and recorded it, she was not in good faith as required
by article 5519. There was, however, no conveyance per se and that alone was sufficient to support the court's judgment. Examples of recitation of the requirement are
in Wilhite v. Davis, 298 S.W.2d 928, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, no writ); Epps
v. Finehout, 189 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd
w.o.m.). Professor Larson is of the opinion that good faith here means "little more than
seriousness in asserting a claim of right." Larson, Texas Limitations: The TwentyFive Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177, 193 (1961).
332. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5.519 (Supp. 1975).
333. Alexander v. Glasscock, 271 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1954, no writ); Owens v. Jackson, 35 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1931, writ dism'd).
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Article 5519a

The adverse claimant must establish two facts under article 5519a
in order to make a prima facie case that he has title to the disputed
land. First, he must show that the apparent record holder of title has
not exercised dominion over the land, or paid the taxes on it before
they became delinquent, for one or more years in the 25 years preceding the filing of the suit.13 4 Secondly, he must show that he, and
those under whom he holds possession, have openly exercised dominion over and asserted claim to the land and have paid the real estate

taxes for 25 years preceding filing of the suit.""6 One problem
with this statute is how "dominion" differs from "peaceable and adverse
possession," if at all.

The decisions indicate merely that the exercise

of dominion requires less than peaceable and adverse possession, but
more than sporadic and widely separated ventures onto the land.3 36
Another problem raised by the language of the statute concerns the
effect on the claimant in the event that the apparent record holder pays
the taxes on the land for one or more years during the 25-year period.
The cases show a conflict, with some stating that the claimant's pay-

ment of taxes before delinquency and assertion of dominion must be
for 25 consecutive years,33 7 while one other case holds that a year is
added to the statutory period for each year the claimant fails to pay
38
his taxes before delinquency.1

If the claimant can establish the two elements included in the statute,
the court extends a presumption that a deed exists in his favor, but

such presumption is one of fact and not law, and open to rebuttal.33 9
Even if a claimant meets the requirements of article 5519a, and the
record owner fails to rebut the presumption, the claimant does not have
334. Love v. McGee, 378 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Garret v. Downs, 377 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ).
335. Love v. McGee, 378 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, .writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Garret v. Downs, 377 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ).
336. King v. Hester, 200 F.2d 807, 815 (5th Cir. 1952); Gilbert v. Lobley, 231
S.W.2d 969, 973 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950), aff'd, 149 Tex. 493, 236 S.W.2d
121 (1951). See also Purnell v. Gulihur, 339 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
337. Pagel v. Pumphrey, 204 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Duke v. Houston Oil Co., 128 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
338. See Purnell v. Gulihur, 339 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
339. Duke v. Houston Oil Co., 128 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.). The court stated that this presumption was the public
policy of the state. Id. at 485.
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absolute title to the property, but only prima facie proof that title is
matured in him.3"' While the 25-year statutes accomplish the purposes for which they were enacted, there is no apparent reason why
all three statutes should not be consolidated into one in the interests
of simplification.
DISABILITIES IN THE RECORD TITLE HOLER OF LAND
WHICH TOLL STATUTES OF LIMITATION

The primary purpose in permitting statutory disabilities to toll the
3, 5 and 10-year statutes of limitation3 4 ' is to alleviate certain common
situations in which the record owner's ability to protect his property
rights is impaired. Those disabilities which affect land actions are
presently enumerated in article 5518,342 which should be read in conjunction with article 5544 .43
The tolling effect of the disabilities,
however, is nullified if 25 years pass after a cause of action accrues
to the record owner for recovery of real estate. 44
There are certain general characteristics of these disabilities. For
example, for any of the disabilities to have a tolling effect on one of
the statutes of limitation the disability must have existed in the record
owner when his cause of action accrued. Article 5518 specifies that
limitations shall not run against the record owner if he is under one
of the disabilities when he acquires title, or when an adverse claimant
340. Carter & Bro. v. Rhoden, 72 S.W.2d 620, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934,
writ dism'd), citing Kellogg v. Southwestern Lumber Co., 44 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd).
341. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507-5510 (1958).
342. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975) reads in part:
If a person entitled to sue for the recovery of real property or make any defense
founded on the title thereto, be at the time such title shall first descend or the adverse possession commence:
1. A person, including a married person, under twenty-one years of age, or
2. In time of war, a person in the military or naval service of the United States,
or
3. A person of unsound mind, or
4. A person imprisoned, the time during which such disability or status shall continue shall not be deemed any portion of the time limited for the commencement
of such suit, or the making of such defense; and such person shall have the same
time after the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions
of this title ....
343. TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 5544 (1958) provides:
The period of limitation shall not be extended by the connection of one disability
with another; and, when the law of limitation shall begin to run . . . notwithstanding any supervening disability of the party entitled to sue liable to be sued.
For a discussion of the history of articles 5518 and 5544, see Larson, Disabilities and
Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J. 590, 590-92 (1962).
344. This nullifying effect is propounded in the proviso to TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5518 (Supp. 1975).
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takes possession. 45 Furthermore, article 5544 provides that "when
the law of limitation shall begin to run, it shall continue to run, notwithstanding any supervening disability. . . ."I
Texas courts have long
held that a later occurrence of a disability in the record holder of title

is ineffective to toll the statutes of limitation in favor of an adverse pos-

sessor. 4 7 Similarly, it makes no difference whether the person labor-

ing under a disability receives the land by conveyance, 8 ' or by devise
or descent:349 limitations continue to run. If a person's disability was
in existence when an adverse claimant took possession, the record
owner's later conveyance of the property causes limitations to run
against his grantee from the time of conveyance.3 5 ° While the operation
of such a rigid requisite can conceivably create harsh results, it is
founded on the public policy that statutes of limitation should ordinarily
3 51
function without hindrance.
In connection with this policy the legislature has enacted a specific
proscription against the "tacking" or joining of two or more disabilities
for the purpose of lengthening the period for which limitations are
tolled. 52 Most of the cases have involved an attempt to tack the now
repealed disability of coverture 53 to some other disability,35 4 but other

345. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975).
346. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5544 (1958).
347. Broom v. Pearson, 98 Tex. 469, 474, 85 S.W. 790, 792, afj'd on rehearing, 98
Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733 (1905); Carter v. Associated Transfer & Storage Co., 410 S.W.2d
830, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, no writ); Stubbs v. Lowrey's Heirs, 253 S.W.2d
312, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ refd n.r.e.); cf. Blum v. Elkins, 369
S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ); Murray v. Slater, 274
S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, no writ).
348. Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 338-39, 12 S.W. 207, 208 (1888); Houston
Oil Co. v. Choate, 215 S.W. 118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1919), aff'd, 232
S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).
349. "The running of the statute ![of limitations] . .. is not suspended by reason
of the fact that the heir is a minor or is of unsound mind." Condra v. Grogan Mfg.
Co., 149 Tex. 380, 386, 233 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1950); see Howard v. Stubblefield, 79
Tex. 1, 5, 14 S.W. 1044, 1045 (1890); Moody's Heirs v. Moeller, 72 Tex. 635, 637, 10
S.W. 727, 728 (1889); Strickland v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 181 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ); Allison v. California Petroleum Corp., 158 S.W.2d
597, 598-600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Sandmeyer v. Dolijsi, 203 S.W. 113, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1918, writ ref'd).
350. Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 149 Tex. 380, 385, 233 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1950).
351. Larson, Disabilitiesand Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J.
590, 594 (1962).
352. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 5544 (1958).
353. Coverture was abolished as a disability in 1895. Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 3352
(1895) was the predecessor of TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5518 (Supp. 1975). It
is well settled that coverture can no longer toll statutes of limitation to 'land actions.
See, e.g., Lotus Oil Co. v. Spires, 240 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Collins v. Griffith, 125 S.W.2d 419, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1938, writ ref'd); Barrett v. Crump, 15 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929,
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combinations have been tried.35 5 Any interruption of a record owner's
disability begins the running of the limitation period, and a subsequent
relapse or reimposition of the disability has no tolling effect.3 56 Tacking of successive disabilities in the record owner, or cumulative disabilities in two or more persons, such as grantee's disability onto grantor's,
or of an heir's minority onto the ancestor's disability, have been rejected. 5 7 On such occasions the supreme court has propounded a
blanket disapproval of further permutations which the inventive practitioner might envision. 5
Minority
The disability of minority is present in any landowner under 21 years
of age, 5 9 and has prevented the running of limitations in numerous
cases. 60 This is a disability personal to the minor, and does not, for
example, aid his cotenant,3 6 nor does it affect an adverse possessor's
no writ). Although a minor may marry, the disability of minority is not disturbed. See
Collins v. Griffith, 125 S.W.2d 419, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ ref'd);

Holt v. Holt, 59 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933, writ ref'd); for
a detailed discussion of the abolishment of coverture as a disability, see Larson, Disabilities and Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J. 590, 596-99 (1962).
354. See Kruse v. Sanders, 231 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1950, no
writ); Louisiana & Tex. Lumber Co. v. Lovell, 147 S.W. 366, 367 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1912, no writ); Elcan v. Childress, 89 S.W. 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905,
writ ref'd); McConnico v. Thompson, 47 S.W. 537, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.. 1898, writ
ref'd).
355. See, e.g., Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1933, writ ref'd) (disability of an insane owner cannot be tacked to the disability of
her surviving minor children).
356. Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 9.55, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no
writ); see Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no
writ); Kramer v. Sidlo, 233 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, no writ).
357. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Green, 251 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1933, writ ref'd).
358. Jackson v. Houston, 84 Tex. 622, 626, 19 S.W. 799, 801 (1892).
"[A]n op.
posite construction would have the effect of defeating the benign object of such laws
[statutes of limitation]; and so, as it is said, 'a right might travel through minorities
for centuries.'" Hunton v. Nichols, 55 Tex. 217, 230 (1881).
359. TEx. Rav. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5518(1) (Supp. 1975). There is no apparent
reason why the age of majority within the framework of this statute is 21, instead of
18. The legislators have seemingly carried forward the language of the earlier statute
without considering this point.
360. E.g., Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 273, 224 S.W.2d 471, 475 (1949); Morton
v. Morton, 286 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ); Lotus Oil
Co. v. Spires, 240 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
For an exhaustive compilation of such cases, see Larson, Disabilities and Actions
for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J. 590, 594 n.24 (1962).
361. Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 338, 12 S.W. 207, 208 (1888); Stoval v.
Carmichael, 52 Tex. 383, 386 (1880).
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claim to the minor's property held in trust.36 2
The principal uncertainty involved in this disability concerns the time

at which the statutes of limitation begin to run. Relying on common
law principles, the supreme court has held that since birthdays are included in the computation of age, the statutes of limitation begin to

run on the day before the 21st anniversary of birth. 3

The court

stated further that a record owner had until the second day before the

anniversary of birth, plus the period of whichever statute of limitation
was at issue, to file his suit.3 64 The reason for this is that the day of
the 21st anniversary is included in computing the period that limitations
must run."' 5 Minority will not, however, impede the adverse possessor
as it does the record owner of the land;36 6 the only prerequisite is that

the minor claimant claim adversely for himself.367
Unsound Mind
The disability of unsound mind, like that of minority, has been fre-

quently examined by the courts.31 8 This disability is not dependent
on an adjudication of insanity, 69 but if there has been such an adjudication, there is a presumption of continuing insanity until such time as
the record owner's sanity is judicially reinstated.3 70 The statutes of
limitation run from the time of restoration of sanity-not from the time

362. Weiss v. Goodhue, 98 Tex. 274, 278-80, 83 S.W. 178, 179 (1904).
363. Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172, 175, 19 S.W. 1090, 1091 (1892).
364. Id. at 175, 19 S.W. at 1091. To illustrate, plaintiff born January 1, 1900, would
reach majority under article 5518 on December 31, 1920 and if the 3-year statute was
plead in bar by defendant, plaintiff would have through December 30, 1920, to file his
suit. Professor Larson points out in his article that at least one court has incorrectly
figured these computations. Larson, Disabilitiesand Actions for the Recovery of Land
in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J. 590, 595 (1962).
365. Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172, 175, 19 S.W. 1090, 1091 (1892)..
366. Petty v. Griffin, 241 S.W. 252, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1922, writ
dism'd).
367. Houston Oil Co. v. Griffin, 166 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1914,
writ ref'd). Where the minor claims and occupies the land for his own, with the parents' consent and without the parents asserting claim to it, the consent emancipates the
minor, as far as right to acquire land. Id. at 904.
368. E.g., Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co., 149 Tex. 380, 386, 233 S.W.2d 565, 568
(1950); Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no
writ); Kramer v. Sidlo, 233 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, no writ);
Zachry v. Moody, 59 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ ref'd);
Kaack v. Stanton, 112 S.W. 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd).
369. Joy v. Joy, 156 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, writ ref'd
w.o.m.); Kaack v. Stanton, 112 S.W. 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ refd).
370. Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no
writ); Kramer v. Sidlo, 233 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, no writ);
Elliot v. Elliot, 208 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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of possession by the adverse claimant. 3 71 A clear statement of what
mental condition constitues unsound mind was made in Pugh v.
Clark, 7 2 where the court stated that the record owner was of unsound
mind if he "did not have [sufficient] capacity to understand the nature
of bringing or defending a suit for land. . . ,,a71 Thus, the term "unsound mind" has a broader meaning than "insanity," but it is apparently
not so expansive as the term "incompetency." This was demonstrated
when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that an
adjudication of incompetency in Oklahoma was not sufficient to toll the
statute of limitation. 7 4
Imprisonment, Military Service, and Other Claimed Disabilities
A record owner who is imprisoned at the time an adverse claimant
takes possession of the land is protected by his disability. 75 There
have been, however, very few cases in which this disability has been
asserted. In Lasater v. Waits3 76 it was held that continuous confinement in a penal institution was "imprisonment" within the meaning of
the disability.3 7 7 It is clear, however, that imprisonment of the record
owner after adverse possession commences has no tolling effect.3 78
While article 5518 provides that limitations will not run against a
person "in time of war . . . in the military or naval service of the
United States," 3 79 its effect is superseded by a more expansive federal
statute.380 The federal statute tolls limitations even if the disability
arises subsequent to the commencement of adverse possession, and
Texas courts have given the federal law precedence over article
5518.381
371.

Holt v. Hedberg, 316 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no

writ).
372. 238 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
373. Id. at 986. Similar language is found in Joy v. Joy, 156 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
374. Thlocco v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 F.2d 934, 937-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 785 (1944). The Oklahoma statute specifically provided that "unsound
mind" was equivalent to insanity. Id. at 937-38.
375. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5518(4) (Supp. 1975),
376. 67 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 95 Tex. 553, 68
S.W. 500 (1902).
377. Id. at 519.
378. Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ). No
disability has a tolling effect unless present in the record owner at the time adverse pos-

session commences. See cases cited note 54 supra.
379. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5518(2) (Supp. 1975).
380. Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 525 (App. .1970). See
generally Bell v. Baker, 260 S.W. 158 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).
381. Scruggs v. Troncalli, 307 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ
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Burden of Proof
As a general rule, the burden of proving the existence of a disability
in the record owner of land is on the person asserting it, and the adverse
claimant need not prove the absence of disability at the time the claimant took possession.8 82 It has been held, however, that although the
disability of minority must be negated by the adverse possessor, he
need not affirmatively show an absence of insanity or imprisonment.8 8 3
Professor Larson considers this distinction to be unwarranted since the
party most able to prove minority is the record owner, who desires the
benefit of the statute.8 84 One further exception is provided: when the
plaintiff brings a suit for injury to property acquired, by prescription
or adverse possession, from a third party,88 5 the burden rests on the
plaintiff to prove there was no disability on the record owner of the
land. 8 6 The reason for this is that the defendant is in no better position to prove disability in the record owner than is the plaintiff, since
38 7
the original record owner is not a party to the suit.
While article 5518 clearly does not list all the situations which occasion an actual "disability" in the landowner, it does provide for the
more common ones. Ample justification for the disabilities can be
found in the public policy which seeks to protect those persons who
are ordinarily incapable or unlikely to have the ability to protect their
property rights.
The 25-year statutes of limitation run against the record owner
ref'd n.r.e.); Johnston v. Stinson, 215 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Easterling v. Murphey, 11 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1928, writ ref'd).
Other disabilities have been alleged, but the courts have been unwilling to expand the
statutory list. See Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 73 S.W.2d 969, 974 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ dism'd) (forfeiture of right to do business in Texas);
Houston Oil Co. v. Griffin, 166 S.W. 902, 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1914, writ
ref'd) (corporation in receivership). For other examples see, Larson, Disabilities and
Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J. 590, 601 n.63 (1962).
382. E.g., Morton v. Morton, 286 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1955, no writ); Elcan v. Childress, 89 S.W. 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, writ ref'd);
accord, Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 57, 66, 228 S.W. 543, 546 (1921); see Niemann v.
Garcia, 144 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt
cor.).

383. Smith v. Lancaster, 248 S.W. 472, 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1923, writ
ref'd).
384. Larson, Disabilities and Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw. L.J.
590, 602 (1962).
385. City of Austin v. Hall, 93 Tex. 591, 57 S.W. 563 (1900).
386. Id. at 596, 57 S.W. at 564.
387. See Larson, Disabilitiesand Actions for the Recovery of Land in Texas, 16 Sw.
LJ. 590, 603 (1962).
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despite any disability.388 The rule is also grounded in public policy,
in that a certain period of adverse possession ought to be sufficient to
mature title in the claimant, regardless of the record owner's disabling
circumstances. In spite of this overriding effect of the 25-year statutes
of limitation, there is one disability, that of military service, which ap89
parently will toll even the 25-year statutes. The federal statute
supersedes any contravening state legislation, but as yet there has been
no case where a record owner has invoked the federal statute against
a claimant under one of the 25-year statutes.
388. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5518, 5519 (Supp. 1975), and art. 5519a
(1958).
389. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 525 (App. 1970).
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